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Tariff rates based on Ramsey - Wilson model of changing welfare
criterion satisfying equity and efficiency have been estimated for three
categories of consumers of an urban water supply in India. The design
necessitates values of marginal cost and price elasticity. Paucity of data
severely restricts estimation of marginal cost compelling to use breakeven
as proxy. Price elasticity is obtained from household expenditure data
by applying recoverability theory suggested by Pollak and Wales. The
effect of household composition on elasticity has been eliminated by
expressing variables on a per capita basis using adult equivalent scale
(AES). Calculation of AES for water is based on Prais-Houthakker
incremental method. The scale indicates that it is totally different from
Amsterdam scale, the AES of food.
Maximum welfare is given to small quantity consumers by charging
a rate below breakeven combined with a subsidy arising from the surplus
generated in the markup of large quantity consumers. The middle group
is charged only the breakeven rate. The model can be generalised to any
number of groups by assigning different welfare weights ranging from
zero to one. The model breaks down if the rate exceeds stand-alone cost.
3Introduction
Developing world confronts two challenges today in the provision
of drinking water. While the first concern is to reach the uncovered
millions in the shortest period, the second is to improve the quality and
quantity of already existing supply. The resources needed for meeting
the above conflicting challenges are beyond the reach of most of these
countries, mainly due to: (i) an unscientific tariff design; (ii) flows of
subsidy with very little economic rationale on equity; and (iii) very little
political will to generate resources within the sector. As a result quite
often the commodity is being charged only at a nominal rate, much below
the cost of production, leaving the burden entirely on the public
exchequer. Realizing the gravity of the problem, the “Earth Summit”
has called for treating water as an economic good in all its uses and
appealed to the global community to formulate policies for achieving
it1. One of the most important elements in such a policy package is the
design of appropriate user financing. But hardly any study exists that
facilitates the policy makers for achieving this objective2. The present
study is an attempt in this direction in the design of an equitable and
efficient tariff rate for drinking water with a case study of an urban water
supply in the state of Kerala, India.
1 Serageldin, I; 1995.
2 Whittington, et.al. (1990) and  Pushpangadan and Murugan (1977) are the few
exceptions. See also World Bank (1975).
4The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the models
in public utility pricing relevant for drinking water and also develops a
tariff model with changing welfare weights.  Section 3 illustrates a
methodology for the estimation of breakeven rate. Section 4 devises the
adult equivalent scale for water consumption in order to arrive at income
and price elasticities using recoverability theory. Section 5 designs a
tariff rate with equity  based on Ramsey prices   followed by a summary
and conclusion in section 6.
II
2.1   Utility pricing : a review
The theory of pricing needs to be reviewed in order to identify the
principles that are applicable to drinking water. Since the commodity
under consideration, especially in the urban areas, is regarded as an
entitlement at reasonable rates and cannot be distributed under normal
market structure, it has the basic features of public utility. Recent World
Development Report (1994) also substantiates this view by classifying
piped water as a public utility. From this point of view, only public utility
pricing needs to be surveyed.
Pricing according to the marginalist principle is the first best way
of fixing the rate of a utility, which depends on the shape of the cost
function. If the cost function is of the traditional U-shape,  then the
application of marginalist rule depends on whether the firm is facing a
decreasing, constant or increasing cost condition. The marginalist rule
is applicable, as is well known, in the case of constant and increasing
cost condition even though the latter generates an economic surplus.  If
the cost is decreasing, the first best price incurs a loss and hence other
pricing methods need to be devised. In the case of urban water supply
one would expect a decreasing cost function since the capacity of the
system is designed taking into consideration of the future expansion of
5the city and the population growth. In such situations, marginal principle
will be applicable only with revenue constraint as conceived by Ramsey
(1927) for an efficient rate structure.
To bring out the Ramsey pricing rule in terms of elasticity and its
distributional and welfare effects in the case of water, Baumol and
Bradford (1970) formulation is considered.
Consider a monopolist producing 'n' commodities, x1,..,xn with
prices p1,..,pn. Let the consumers’ benefit function be Z(p1,..,pn) and profit
function be π (p1,..,pn) = K. When K = 0, the constraint satisfies the
breakeven. The efficient set of prices that maximises consumers surplus
subject to profit constraint is given by3
Max  L(p1,..,pn) = Z(p1,..,pn) + λ{K-π (p1,..,pn)}   ... (1)
p1,..,pn ,  λ
where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier.
First order condition for (1) is
δZ/δpi = λδ π/δpi       i = 1,..,n       ... (2)
  π (p1,..,pn) = K
 Condition (2) implies that marginal benefit of the consumer is
proportional to the marginal profit cost of the producer for all goods,
where the constant of proportionality being the Lagrangean multiplier.
In order to express this in terms of elasticity, the welfare gain should be
related to price-quantity data for which Hicksian proposition is used.
According to Hicks, the derivative of the benefit function with respect
to price is equal to the negative of the quantity consumed before the
price change4.
3 See for other versions of Ramsey pricing Brown and Sibley (1986): pp.39-41.
and Wilson (1993): pp.101-102.
4 See Baumol and Bradford (1970): p. 269.
6 i.e.  δZ \δpi = - xi      i = 1,..,n          ... (3)
Taking the derivative of profit function,
δπ/δpi = (MRi-MCi) dxi/dpi       ... (4)
Assuming zero cross elasticity MRi = pi + xiδpi/δxi    ...  (5)
Substituting (3), (4) and (5) in (2) and rearranging the terms we
have
 (pi-MCi) /pi = {(1+ λ)/ λ}/  εi =  α /εi i= 1,...,n   ... (6)
where  α is the Ramsey number which is equal to {(1+λ)/λ}, and
εi is the own-price elasticity of ‘ith’ commodity. This is the famous second
best pricing rule (Ramsey prices) for a natural monopoly. It implies that
the mark-up should be proportional to the inverse of the price elasticity
in order to obtain efficient set of prices5.
But for a product like drinking water which has absolutely no
substitute and is a basic necessity, Ramsey rates have serious
distributional effects and efficiency aspects as demonstrated by the
following diagram.
Fig. 1 Nonlinear Tariff and Welfare
5 See Baumol and Bradford (1970): . for three equivalent ways of stating the rule
7For simplicity, consider the demand for water from household and
industry sectors only. Obviously, the household demand is more inelastic
than industrial demand since the industries respond more to a price
change. In such a situation, a decrease in the price from p0 to p1 have
different welfare gains to the consumers. More specifically consumer
surplus reduces by the triangular region ‘a’ for household consumers
whereas it reduces further by the area given by ‘b’ for industrial consumer.
In other words, the psychic loss to the industrial user is much higher
than that of the domestic user. But, Ramsey rule on the other hand suggests
that  a higher rate should be charged for household consumption than for
industrial use. This poses a distributional problem in the sense that, the
rate is low for consumers with higher ability to pay and vice versa. Hence
the Ramsey prices need to be corrected for this undesirable distributional
effects.
Since the demand for water per household is smaller than that of
per industrial unit, a nonlinear price reduces the welfare of the former
and increases that of the latter as shown in the diagram6. For this, consider
the change from a breakeven, linear price p1 to a nonlinear price, say, a
two-part tariff. Two part tariff consist of  a price p2 plus an entry fee
equal to (p1-p2)I1. The gain of the large consumer is equal to the triangular
area ‘f’ given in the diagram. The small consumer on the other hand
looses to the tune of ‘a’ minus ‘e’(a+c+d-c-d-e).  The firm is also
generating surplus to the tune of  ‘j’ plus ‘k’. Obviously the small
consumer is worse off, and the large consumer and the firm are better
off. If a menu of linear and nonlinear rates are given to the consumers,
then the small consumer would opt for linear and the large consumer the
non linear rate making everybody better off including the firm. The
nonlinear price becomes acceptable to the small consumer, if a transfer
6 See Brown and Sibley (1986): p.69.
8of surplus equivalent to the trapezoidal region ‘e’ is made from the large
consumer or the firm or both to the small. However such a policy
encourages conspicuous consumption if ‘H1’ represents the ‘necessary’
quantity required for the household. In such situations a nonlinear price
encourages only increased consumption of a scarce commodity which
needs conservation.
In addition to this water has become a scarce commodity due to
population pressure, increased and rapid urbanisation, changes in
technology of extraction, and other competing uses. This warrants the
rate to be increasing with every increase in the consumption. For this,
Ramsey prices needs to be modified using other welfare criteria as
suggested by Wilson7. In effect, Wilson’s model makes the Ramsey
number dependent on the average welfare weights of those customers
purchasing each unit. For this, the consumers are divided into two groups:
one group consuming above a given quantity q* and the other below it.
The rates can be obtained by assigning ‘1’ for quantities above q* and
‘0’ for below q* for the Ramsey number8. This would mean that maximum
welfare is assigned to small consumers, below q*, by charging a rate
below the marginal cost and minimum or zero  welfare for consumers of
large quantities, above q*, by charging a monopoly price. The resulting
rate is:
P = MC ,        for small consumers (q < q‡* and α = 0);  ... (7)
   = MC {1/(1-1/ε)} for large consumers (q > q* and α = 1);
This formula is implementable and sustainable only if the rate of
the higher group is less than the cost of private arrangement.
7  See Wilson (1993:p.107).
8 This is an extreme example of changing welfare weights. In principle any weight
from 0 to 1 can be assigned in the tariff design.
9In order to estimate this rate structure, we need the marginal cost
and demand elasticities. Ideally one requires the cost function for deriving
the marginal cost. But unavailability of data  prevents us from estimating
it. Hence we use the breakeven as a proxy for it. This is illustrated in the
case of an urban water supply catering mainly to Thiruvananthapuram,
the capital city of Kerala state, India for the year 1992.
III
3.1   Estimation of breakeven cost.
Breakeven cost of the system consists of three components: (i)
variable cost; (ii) replacement cost; and (iii) other quasi-fixed cost. The
details regarding the estimation of these three components are discussed
below.
3.2  Total variable cost
The cost of supplying drinking water consists of expenses on
production and distribution. The former includes cost of treatment,
pumping and laboratory charges of raw and treated water. The latter
includes maintenance of pumping mains and distribution network, and
metering and allied activities9. However the following equation is used
for the calculation of variable cost mainly due to limitations of data.
Total variable cost for year t (TVCt) = Wt + Et + Ct + Mt...(8)
where, Wt = wages and salaries of the employees;
Et =  cost of electricity for production and distribution;
Ct =  cost of chemicals at destination; and
Mt =  cost incurred for the maintenance, repair and upkeep
of building and fixed capital.
9 See Clark and Stevis (1981): Murugan (1993) for details. Opportunity cost of
water is assumed to be zero.
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Since water from the scheme is used by both household and
industrial consumers, the rate chargeable to household consumers should
be based on that portion of the cost relating to their consumption. It is
estimated that  about 16 % of the total supply is being used for industrial
and other activities10. Hence only 84% of the total variable cost in 1992
is taken for the analysis.
This portion of the total variable cost  based on equation (8) is:
(a) TVC1992  =  Rs. 109280800.
Now let us move on to the computation of the second component,
replacement cost.
3.3   Replacement cost.
The annual replacement cost can be estimated if cost of fixed capital
and the life span of the system are known. It should also include the
interest payments if the funds are borrowed. In such situations the
following methodology can be used.
Let I be the initial investment for the system with a life of ‘t’
years. Total amount (A) that should be recovered during the life as
principal and interest payment is:
A = I(1+r)t
If the recovery of the amount is distributed uniformly over the life
cycle, then annual recovery rate (R) is given by
R = A/t        ...(9).
Equation (8) forms the basis for the calculation of replacement
cost below.
10 Tata Consulting Engineers (1992).
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The water supply has two treatment plants; of which the life span
of the first one is already over. Therefore investment on the second plant
alone is considered here. Investment in plant II was completed in 1977
followed by a capacity addition in 1986.  In addition to this a Dam for
storage of water was also constructed in 1983. Life expectancy, according
to engineering expectations, for both plants and dam is about fifty years.
The amounts to be recovered as annual replacement cost after adjusting
for inflation in 1992 from the investment in three different years are
given below11:
(b)   Annuity in 1992 from 1977 investment in plant = Rs.  2211672
(c)   Annuity in 1992 from 1986 capacity addition = Rs.   1285693
(d)   Annuity in 1992 from 1983 investment in dam = Rs.   2168700
(e)   Total replacement cost [(b) + (c) + (d)] = Rs.   5666065
(f)    Attributable replacement cost to household
        consumption {84% of (e)} =  Rs.   4759495
This leaves us the estimation of any quasi-fixed cost related to
household demand which is taken up next.
3.4   Quasi-fixed cost
Data on production cost contain expenses on administration and
other related activities as a separate item. Since this cost is independent
of the level of production, it is treated as quasi-fixed. The amount for the
year 1992 is:
(g) Administrative (quasi-fixed) cost in 1992  = Rs. 3729463
(h) Attributable quasi-fixed cost {84% of (g)} = Rs. 3132749
11 See Murugan (1993) for methodology.
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The above three components can now be used for the calculation
of breakeven rate for the system as shown below.
3.5   Breakeven rate
Breakeven rate for the year 1992 is obtained by dividing the sum
of variable, replacement and quasi-fixed costs with the total production.
(i)   Total cost {(a) + (f) + (h)} = Rs. 117173044
(j)   Total annual production (Million Liters, ML) =     33883.1
(k)   Breakeven rate    [(i)/(j)] (Rs/ML) =     3458
The estimate indicates that a flat rate of Rs. 3.5 per Kiloliter would
make the system run on breakeven. Let us examine the estimation of
demand elasticities.
IV
4.1   Estimation of demand elasticity
The major difficulty in the estimation of demand function for
water is that there exist hardly any time series data on quantity consumed,
prices and income of the users. This is further aggravated due to infrequent
changes in tariff rates arising from the unwillingness on the part of
governments from time to time in the fear of eroding their popular support
from the masses.  Consequently there is very limited scope for estimating
price elasticity from time series data. However income elasticity can be
obtained from cross-sectional household survey, since enough variation
exists in the income of the households and their demand. In such
situations, Pollak and Wales (1978) have demonstrated that the price
elasticity can be computed from as few as two cross- section surveys
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provided households face two distinct price situations12. This method is
the only way left to obtain price elasticity when there is very little temporal
variation of rates. This technique is exploited for the calculation of price
elasticity as shown below.
4.2   Pollak and Wales method
4.2.1  Theory
The theory used in Pollak and Wales  (henceforth, P-W) method is
briefly reviewed in the case of Linear Expenditure System (LES). The
expenditure function of the ith commodity under LES is given by:
   pixi = pibi + ai (M - ∑ pk bk)   i=1,...,n
  where xi  =  quantity of ith good consumed;
          pi   =  price of ith good; and
          M  =  total expenditure on all goods.
It is to be noted that parameters, a and b, have a very special
meaning in the allocation of income under this model. The model assumes
that the consumer spends money for buying the ‘necessary quantities’,
the b’s, first and then allocates the remaining income among the goods
in fixed proportion13, the a’s. In P-W method, a’s are identified from the
expenditure functions in a single period and the b’s are obtained from
the intersections of the two linear income consumption curves relating
to two periods. The price elasticities are then calculated from the a’s and
b’s. We use  a variant of P-W method in the present case mainly due to
data limitations. The method derives price elasticity from the expenditure
function as shown below.
12 See  Pushpangadan (1984) for a generalised version of the model of Pollak and
Wales.
13 See For details, Pollak and Wales (1978): p. 350.
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Let the demand for drinking water be
ln x = a0 + a1 ln p +a2 ln M  ... (10)
Where x  = quantity of water consumed
p  = tariff rate of water
M = income of the household.
For a cross-section data (10) becomes
ln x = a3 + a2 ln M  ... (11)
It is clear from equations (10) and (11) that the intercept a3 equals
a0 plus a1 ln p. The two unknowns, a0 and a1, are determined only if there
are two equations which obviously require two cross section data from
two time periods or data relating to two price situations in a single cross
section. From the two samples, the following equations can be obtained.
  a0 + a1 ln p1 =  a31        ... (12)
  a0 + a1 ln p2 =  a32        ... (13)
where p1 and p2 are the prices facing the households, a31 and a32 are
the estimates of intercepts in the expenditure functions from the two
samples.
Subtracting (13) from (12),
      a1 = (a31-a32)/(ln p1-ln p2)    ... (14)
Equation (14) gives the estimate of a1, the price elasticity.
4.2.2   Estimation
Data
The estimation is based on a sample of 424 households, with
metered connections from the urban system, drawn on the basis of
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stratified systematic sampling14. According to present tariff, the sample
of households belongs to three consumption slabs: less than 10 Kiloliter
per month (klpm); between 10 and 30 klpm; and greater than 30 klpm
with corresponding rates of Rs. 1, 1.5 and 2 per kiloliter. The frequency
distribution of the 424 households in the three slabs are: 21 in the first;
355 in the second; and 48 in the third. Since the households in the three
sub-samples face three different prices, the P-W method becomes
applicable in arriving at the elasticities. In addition to income and price
effect, consumption depends on age and sex composition of the members
in the households. Therefore, consumption has to be adjusted for this. In
demand studies, two methods are used for overcoming this problem. In
the first method, the effect is incorporated in the specification of the
demand function through demographic variables. In the second method,
the effect is taken out by expressing the  demand variables on a per
capita basis using adult equivalent scale (AES), since the consumption
of an adult male is neither equal to that of an adult female nor that of a
child. The second method is applied here which requires the construction
of AES. AES for water is constructed using the simplest method suggested
by Prais (1953), and Prais and Houthakker (1971) as follows.
Adult equivalent scale
The adult equivalent scale is obtained by expressing the
consumption of each member of the household relative to that of an
adult, usually male. The survey data contain total water consumed and
the number of members in each household. Household size is further
classified into adult male, adult female and children below the age of
five years as well as between five and fifteen years. The children were
grouped into two, mainly due to the change in the levels of their
consumption. The first group, below five years, usually consumes lower
14 See Murugan (1993) for the details.
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quantities than that of the second, since the former unlike the latter uses
water mostly under the supervision of parents or other adult members.
Besides, children are likely to be free from such control by the time they
reach the age of more or less 15, especially females due to biological
reasons. The average monthly consumption per person is secured from
the corresponding figures of different household sizes using incremental
method as presented in Table 1. For example, the average consumption
of an adult male is obtained from subtracting the consumption of a
household with one male and one female from that of a household with
two males and one female. It is evident from Table 1 that the adult female
consumes, on an average,  the maximum amount of water.
Table 1:  Adult equivalent scale for water
 Household size consumption  AES
(Klpm)
Per Per
Household Person
(a)      1 male and 1 female  15.79 -
(b)      1 male, 1 female and 1 child
            < 5 years. 16.13 -
(c)      1 male, 1 female, 1 child
            < 5 years and 1 child 5 to 15 yrs. 16.79
(d)      2 males  and 1 female 18.53 -
(e)      1 male and 2 females 21.58 -
            Adult male   [(d) - (a)] 2.74  2.74/5.79 = 0.47
Adult female [(e) - (a)]   5.79 5.79/5.79 = 1
Child < 5 years [(b) - (a)]  0.34 0.34/5.79 = 0.06
Child 5 to 15 years [(c) - (b)]        0.66     0.66/5.79 = 0.11
Source: Sample Survey.
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Since an adult female consumes the largest amount of water, it is
taken as the numeraire for the calculation of AES. This gives the following
scale: adult female = 1; adult male = 0.47; children (between the age of
five and fifteen) = 0.11; and children (below the age of five) = 0.06. Let
us compare AES of water with AES of food articles15. AES for food
based on nutritional requirements is: adult male = 1; adult female = 0.92;
and child below the age of fifteen = 0.52. It is interesting to note that, an
adult female is equal to 0.92 of an adult male in food consumption
whereas it is the other way round for water, i.e., an adult female requires
twice the quantity of an adult male. This clearly indicates the
inappropriateness of using AES of food for adjusting the household size
effect in the demand for water. AES of water were utilised for measuring
the per capita variables in the estimation of demand elasticities of water
given below.
Elasticity
Application of P-W method to recover elasticities requires the
expenditure functions. The functions were obtained by regressing per
capita consumption on per capita floor area as a proxy for income16. The
resulting elasticities for the three sub-samples are given in Table 2.
15 AES of food articles, known as Amsterdam scale, is from    Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980): p.193.
16 Income, measured through direct method, is subject to a wide margin of error in
the survey data. Hence total floor area of the household is taken to be a better
proxy in order to minimise the errors in variables.
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Table 2: Demand elasticities of drinking water
Size class  Elasticity
(klpm)  Income  Price
 <10 0.53   -.06
 10 - 30 0.59  -.07
 > 30  0.38  -.04
Source:  Appendix A
The value of income elasticity clearly shows the essential nature
of the commodity. Moreover the proportion of income spend on water is
lower for the highest size class in the sample, a validation of Engel’s law
for water as well17. For price elasticity using P-W method, the expenditure
functions with significant intercept terms were only considered. As a
result, price elasticity has been estimated only for the size class, 10-30,
by applying the formula given in equation (14). For the remaining two,
lower and upper classes,  we have utilised the proportionality between
income and price elasticity implied in additive utility functions as shown
by Deaton (1974). For n commodities under additive preference functions,
this relationship becomes:
  eii = φ ei        i,...,n
where eii is the own-price elasticity, ei is the income elasticity of
the ith commodity and φ the constant of proportionality.  In other words,
if φ is known only one of the elasticities in a size class is needed to
17 This is valid since households with higher consumption are found to have higher
per capita floor area.
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obtain the other.  This principle is applied for the calculation of price
elasticities for the first and the last group of consumers using the constant
of proportionality implied in the middle group. The estimates, given in
Table 2, form the basis for tariff design with changing welfare weights.
V
Tariff structure
Rates are designed using a generalised version of Ramsey-Wilson
model as  given in equation (7) with varying welfare weights for different
consumers. In this version we consider three groups of consumers with
subsidy for the smallest group from the surplus generated in the highest
group. The middle group is charged at the marginal cost.  The resulting
rate structure is given below.
Modified Ramsey-Wilson model
R  =  MC - k/ε         (q < q* , α  = 0)
     =  MC                 (q = q* , α  = 0)
     =  MC + 1/ε       (q > q*,  α  = 1)
Where k is the ratio of users in the two groups (lowest and highest)
that distributes the surplus completely  among the consumers.
  This model is estimated for three groups of consumers for whom
the elasticities are available in Table 2. Since MC is unknown, as
mentioned earlier,  breakeven is taken as a proxy.  Consumers in the
middle range (10 to 30 klpm) are charged at the breakeven, since they
spend the largest proportion of their income among the three groups  as
evident from their income elasticities. This would suggest that a welfare
weight of zero is assigned for the Ramsey number in equation (6).
Consumers above the middle range (> 30 klpm) are charged the maximum
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rate by giving ‘α’ a value of unity. Obviously, the consumer in this group
is charged the monopoly price extracting the maximum surplus. The
resulting surplus is completely redistributed among the smaller quantity
consumers (less than 10 klpm). Since the number of connections  in
both the groups are different a factor of proportion has been used for
making the overall rate equal to breakeven. The tariff rate thus arrived at
is given in Table 3.
Table 3:  Tariff rates with varying welfare, 1992
Size Welfare weights unit Block
Class Rate Rate
(klpm) (Rs/kl ) (Rs/kl)
<10 α = 0 with  subsidy  1.7  9
10-30 α = 0 only  3.5 70
>30 α = 1  4.4 154
See: Appendix B
Under  subsidy, the unit rate of the smallest size class has been
reduced to almost half of the breakeven rate. Monopoly price charged to
the largest quantity consumers comes about 26 percent more than the
breakeven. Obviously the block rate penalises heavily the consumers of
larger quantities. For example a monthly consumption of 31 kiloliter
increases the block rate of  the largest group by 120 per cent As a result
this rate has high incentive to reduce consumption. Above all the rate
structure satisfies overall breakeven along with increasing block tariff
for conservation and equity. However the rate is not stable and sustainable
if it is higher than the stand-alone cost as defined by Faulhaber (1975).
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VI
Summary and conclusions.
Ramsey pricing with other welfare criteria as proposed by Wilson
has been estimated for drinking water by a case study of an urban water
supply system. Tariff rate based on the modified Ramsey rule requires
the estimation of marginal cost of production and own- price elasticity
of demand. The calculation of marginal cost is not possible due to
unavailability of time series data on cost of production, input prices and
output. Hence the breakeven cost is estimated and used as a proxy. In
the case of demand elasticity the same data problems were confronted
since no information is available on prices, quantity consumed and the
level of income of the users.  To overcome the paucity of time series
data, Pollak and Wales method of estimating elasticities from as low as
two cross section samples facing two price situations has been employed
after adjusting for household composition effect. The adjustment of this
effect is achieved by expressing demand variables on a per capita basis,
which necessitates the construction of an adult equivalent scale (AES)
specifically for water. The AES for water indicates that it is completely
different from that of food articles.
Tariff rates with changing welfare weights have been designed for
three categories of consumers: large, medium and small. A breakeven is
charged to the middle group which assigns zero welfare weight. The
rate for the largest group of consumers is the monopoly markup which
assigns a welfare weight equal to one. The surplus generated is
redistributed to the lowest group so that it satisfies not only the overall
breakeven but also generates increasing rates for conservation of the
resource.
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One probable limitation of the rate structure is that it may not be
sustainable if it  exceeds the stand-alone cost. The three group model
can be generalised to any number of groups by assigning different welfare
weights ranging from zero to one.
   Appendix A
   Size class Expenditure function
(klpm)
< 10 ln x = - 1.692 + 0.531 ln FA  R2 = 0.54, n = 21
(0.63) (0.11) F(1,19) = 0.001
10 - 30 ln x = - 1.717 + 0.597 ln FA R2 = 0.54, n = 355
(0.17)  (0.029) F(1,353)  = 0.001
> 30 ln x = 0.223 + 0.373 ln FA  R2 =  0.49, n = 48
(0.35)  (0.06) F(1,46) = 0.0001
Where       x  =   per capita consumption of water
FA = per capita floor area of the household.
Appendix B
The block rate is obtained by multiplying the mid-value of each
size class with its corresponding unit rate. In the case of size class, greater
than 30 Klpm, mid value is taken as 35 since the maximum consumption
in this sample is 40 klpm. For the lowest class, it is taken as 5. The unit
rate of the lowest class is calculated in order to achieve over all breakeven
using the formula :
breakeven rate - [3.5 - (4.4-3.5) * 8649/4243],
where 8649 is the total number of connections in size classes (>30)
and 4243 that in the lowest class.
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